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5 Existential ism, Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy 
Douglas Kirsner 
Existentialism and psychoanalysis arc often seen to be in opposition. Howevc1~ 
although there are surely differences, existentialism, psychoanalysis and psy-
chotherapy all share a common quest, problematic, and terrain. This shared 
domain addresses fundamental questions as to the nature of the human condi-
tion, including issues such as anxiety, choice, responsibility, alienation, freedom, 
agency, lit'e, death, relationships, experience and subjectivity. They investigate 
ethics: the question of how best to live, given the nature of human subjectivity. 
The existential response to the past century's record of massive and rapid 
change and unsettling of verities, including religion in the West, meld clearly 
with the same problems that psychoanalysis and psychotherapy address. 
As Rollo May suggested, the attitude that existential analysis was 'an 
encroachment L)f philosophy into psychiatry, and docs not hnve much to do 
with science' was 'partly a hang-over of the clllturally inherited scars from the 
battle of the last of the nineteenth century when psychological science won its 
freedom from metaphysics' (May, 1958, p. 8). The period around 1913 when 
Karl Jaspers published his classic General Psydwpt~Uwlogy reflected a turning 
point in psychiah-y, which h<1d mainly been entrenched in biological paradigms. 
Now taking account of the 'whole person', psychiatry waf:l becoming 'funda-
mentally historic and temporal, interpersonally orientated, and affirming of 
human freedom' (Wertz, 2006, p. 402). The idea that soci<\1 or sexual maladjust-
~ent were no longer deemed sufficient to explain psychological illness was an 
Important seed for the existential psychology movement. This movement arose 
spontaneously in different parts of Europe with diverse contributors sometimes 
unaw<He of each other's work. 
R D. Laing cn'dited Eugene Minkowski (1885-1972) with being the first 
:sych_iatrist to have seriously attempted to 'reconstruct the other person's lived 
~penence' (L<"'ing, 1963, p. 207). Minkowski, drawing on Henri Bergson, created 
p e expression 'lived time', which refers to being able to differentiate past, 
u:sent and future, and of the priority of time over space. He also stressed the 
&J_J>O~tance of meeting reality through 'vital contact', ao·ain reflecting Berg. son's ~~~ Vrtul ( ' . · n 
see Spiegelberg, "1972, pp. 243-6). 
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Two main schools of psychotherapy were founded by existentialists: one by 
followers of Heidegger, and one by followers of Sartre. Swiss psychiatrists 
Ludwig Binswanger and Medard Boss were the two major Heideggerian fig-
ures, while Scottish psychiatrist and psychoanalyst R. D. Laing followed Sartre 
(although he also drew from other figures including Martin Buber, Rollo May 
and Heidegger). There was also Logotherapy, an existential therapy founded 
by Viktor Frankl, highlighted in the title of his well-known 1946 book, Ma11's 
Search for Meaning, which was an account of his experiences in a Nazi concen-
tration camp where he found a 'will to meaning', which in life was the fore-
most human urge. According to him this concept went way beyond his 
Viennese compatriots Nietszche ('will to power') and Freud ('will to pleasure') 
(FrankL 2006). 
Ludwig Binswanger (1881-1966), the founder of the major approach in 
existential psychiatry, observed that the existential movement in psychiatry 
arose from rejecting the idea that psychiatry should deal just with 'mentally ill 
man' rather than w.ith 'man as such'.lt was based on Heidegger's idea that man 
was not to be explained by any theory, whether mechanistic, biological or 
psychological (May, 1958, p. 3). It dealt with human nature itself, which meant 
that illness needed to be understood at least partly in terms of human agency. 
Some of the main concepts Binswanger adopted from Heidegger were the 
Umwelt, Mitwelt and Eigenwelt (the physical, social and personal worlds). 
Medard Boss (1903-1990) extended Heidegger's concepts of past, present 
and future as primary Heideggerian 'existential structures'. From this he 
elaborated his main existential concerns of human space and time (i.e. shared 
rather than individual existence), the body projecting itself forth, and the use of 
associations to describe a mood or 1attunement'. He understood dreams as 
reflective of one's state of being, the way that certain aspects of life are illuminated 
or not, rather than as representing specific unconscious wishes or archetypes. In 
general, for Boss, we do not so much interpret the world as have it reveal itself 
to the light of Dasein. Light and darkness are central metaphors: psycbopathol· 
ogy is a choice to live in darkness, and therapy brings enlightenment of an 
aspect of life that has not previously been illuminated. 
American psychologist and psychoanalyst Rollo May (1909-1994) made a 
substantial contribution to the dissemination of existential ideas in the Anglo-
phone world. He introduced English-speaking ~eaders to the ideas of continen· 
tal thinkers beyond Sartre (who was already known via the route of his novels 
and plays). In 1958 May, together with Ernest '1\ngel and Henri Ellenberger, 
edited a landmark book, Existence, that introduced the existential-
phenomenological psychology of Binswanger, Minkowski and others to t~e 
United States. The book included translations of Binswanger's 1946 grounh-
breaking articles, 'The Existential Analysis School of Thought' (1946) and '1' .e 
Case of Ellen West' (1944) (May et al., 1958). May's influence was such that he 15 
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often referred to as the father of existential psychotherapy. May's ideas often 
overlapped with Binswanger, but he wanted to reconcile existential psychology 
with humanism and Freudian psychoanalysis in the United States. He introduced 
new and reframed some existing existentialist concepts, as is revealed from the 
titles of his best-selling books, including Lave and Will, Power and Innocence, 
Freedom and Destiny, The Courage to Create, and The Discovery of Being. 
R. D. Laing (1927-1989) argued for greater social intelligibility of schizophre-
nia, not for <1 complete explanation in social terms. Laing preferred the dentist 
to use his or her scientific 'look' in examining his teeth, but emphasized the 
inappropriateness of the exclusive use of such a 'look' by a doctor at childbirth. 
The emphasis on the primacy of experience is as a redress to simply looking at 
outcomes or effects. As Laing argued in The Di·oided Self, science deals with what 
is appropriate to it. So the science-based art of dentistry, for example, studies 
teeth and their relation to the mouth. But the study of a mental illness deals 
with the ottributes of mind, however 'mind' is defined. This does not imply 
Descartes's total separation of mind and body, which function on different prin-
ciples. Laing was a psychiatrist who always assumed a role for biology, and was 
influenced by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's more holistic position that we are 
'embodied subjects'. 
A science, as Laing pointed out, deals with the area appropriate to it. Under-
standing human actions properly begins from a standpoint of a 'science of per-
sons', as first outlined in The Divided Self. This starting-point is the apprehension 
of the personal, as a self-acting agent who always chooses, whether he or she 
likes it or not. Laing's commandment: Always treat a person as an agent, a 
choosing being, not a thing. The point of view of Martin Buber's '1-thou' 
division as opposed to 'l-it' is central in The Divided Self, and it continued to 
underpin Laing's further work. If we treat somebody as a 'thou', they are likely 
to behave very differently from if we treat them as an 'it'. This view was at the 
root of Laing's critique of psychiatry, which so often treated persons as pro-
cesses instead of agents. 
Nonetheless, in this, as in so much else, Laing essentially follows Sartre. 
Laing kept very careful and copious notes on his minutely detailed reading of 
Being and Not/1ingness. Laing, together with his anti-psychiatry colleague David 
Cooper, summarized three major later works of Sartre as Reason and Violence. 
Like Sartre, Laing's approach starts from the existential-phenomenological 
:e;ise.that cons~~o~sness is al~ays consci.ousness of s~methi.ng, that it can~ot 
een JUst as an m Itself', but IS always directed and m relation to something 
:son;eone. Laing's primary apprehension is that the person cannot be reduced 
A~ th.J~g as the person is always choosing and deciding, while a thing does not. 
itio ec_181011 is not causally determined but is the action of an agent. That intu-
OUrn 15, shared by both psychoanalysts and existentialists: for psychoanalysts 
acttons may have an unconscious motivation that might be investigated so 
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as to bring it into conscious control; for existentialists, we may be denying our 
role in what is happening and need to recognize it. 
In The Schizoid World of Jean-Paul Sartre and R. D. Laing (Kirsner, 2003), 
I emphasized how very much both Sartre and Laing centred on context and on 
situating the problems of acting meaningfully within it. As inherently social 
beings, we are always in significant relationships with others. Social phenome-
nology is an application of phenomenology that provides more detailed under-
standing of social relationships. 
Existentialism emphasizes the nature of humans as actively choosing beings 
born into a world they did not choose. For existentialists generally, we cannot 
choose not to choose and are responsible for the results of our actions. Gener-
ally, we are oriented towards future action; we are agents who cannot avoid 
choosing futures we often do not see. Existentialists tend to view human beings 
as operating in continuing crisis, who need to constantly question conven-
tional or received notions of what constitutes the best life. But the best life is 
not a universally agreed one, nor is it restricted to particular reasonably stable 
cultures. Philosophies of existence attempt to understand our identity and 
how we can and how we should act in a social and physical context that is not 
of our choosing and most often is not benign. These philosophies viewed the 
human condition as a question that the individual needed to address them-
selves in their own being without recourse to covering generalizations from 
either theology or science. There was a new focus on individual experience as 
connected to the nature of the life-world. There was a particular emphasis on 
the ethic of the self, how and why we choose our world, what the parameters 
of choice are, and the nature of authentic and inauthentic action. 
For many, including philosophers who had not properly separated philoso-
phy from theology, the source of meaning could be viewed as deriving from 
God. Others considered God and meaning independent. But atheistic existen-
tialism, of which Sartre was the leading proponent, put them together, holding 
that values derive from the consequences of there being no God: 
If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is because to begin 
with he is nothing. He will not be anything until later, and then he will be 
what he makes of himself. Thus, there is no human nature, because there is 
no God to have a conception of it. Man simply is. (Sartr~, 1975, p. 349) 
Thus for the existentialists, there is no intrinsic human nature. Whatever our 
identities, they are formed by our interactions with the ou~~ide world. We. are 
our choices, as Sartre wrote in Being and Nothingness. We are judged by ac.t•o~ 
and not intentions. So for Sartre biology is a foundation but not a detcrrrunant 
of action. Albert Camus held that life is absurd and that there is no transcenden 
reason for living, though we are condemned to the consciousness and the_ho~~ 
lessness of this situation. The one thing we can do is rebel, to be clear-s•gh 
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and not succumb to our fate. Like Sartre, Camus at bottom promotes a Sisyphean 
freedom of not allowing the self to be dominated and controlled by outside 
forces. This is the setting or stage on which we act with our freedom, and that 
we cannot escape. But there is a human condition into which we are 'thrown', 
as Heidegger asserted, involving the parameters of life and death, of lack of 
control of a destiny that we nonetheless steer. We dwell in a 'clearing' which 
is a space that enables experience to be created and to become meaningful 
(Heidegger, 1962, p. 113). 
The existentialist understanding of freedom is both optimistic and pessimis-
tic. On the one hand, it is optimistic insofar as we can make the world or at least 
ourselves according to our designs. On the other hand, we cannot escape the 
freedom and thus we bear full responsibility for our actions. Rather than having 
a given make-up that determines our actions, we make our own essence. It is an 
active process that is not reducible to external or biological factors. Instead of 
being give11 meaning, we create meaning ourselves. No matter what the argu-
ments or evidence for or against an action, it is ultimately the result of an 
ineffable decision that we make only on the basis of reasons; our decisions are 
not caused by them. The decision is our responsibility and involves our being-
in-the-world: consciousness is always consciousness of something and is 
intentional. A decision implies an intuitive experience which involves 
phenomenology and not physical reality. 
Along with Sartre's concept of mauvaise foi, self-deception (sometimes mis-
leadingly translated as 'bad faith'), where people attempted to escape their free-
dom by treating themselves or others as objects instead of subjects, the nature 
of Sartre's 'for itself' or 'existence' is that this being is always in question, 
whether or not we want to admit it. The only restriction on individual freedom 
is that as Sartre proposed in Being and Nothingness, we are 'condemned to be 
free', so we ilre not free not to be free. Deception restricts freedom by not reveal-
ing the true situation on which to freely decide upon action. For Sartre, it is 
essential to endeavour to be clear about what is going on, taking into account 
the many personal, social and environmental factors that make for this particu-
lar situation's occurrence. This involves the fine detail of the settings of the 
stage upon which actions are undertaken. Understanding particular actions 
demands that one analyse the biological and social settings within which actions 
are undertaken . 
. Sartre developed his own theory of psychotherapy, which he called 'existen-
~~ P~y~hoanal~sis'. Sartre's existential ps~choanal~sis was based on fi~~ing 
tr Origmal cho1ce that a person makes of hts or her hfe, rather than an ongmal 
auma (as Sartre would have it that Freud sought). Instead of pursuing how a 
:rson :-vas impacted upon by biology, relationships or circumstances, it 
,~~ht Individual meaning in a person's orientation of their actions towards 
· uture as part of a project. Existential psychoanalysis tried to understand the 
87 
The Continuum Companion to Existentialism 
circumstances within which the individual actor then makes a decision in view 
of his or her own goals. It was an attempt to understand the context in which 
the ineffable decision-making process takes place by seeing how the individual 
experiences the situation and acts so as to go beyond it in terms of his or her 
own goals. For Sartre, we are not lumps of clay, and what is important is not 
what people have made of us 'but what we ourselves make of what they have 
made of us' (Sartre, 1964, p. 584). 
In the case of the writer Jean Genet, Sartre sought to understand how Cenet 
transcended his situation as an orphan who seemed destined to become a thief 
when he was discovered stealing something. Sartre surmised that Genet rejected 
the identity as a thief and decided to become a writer at that moment (Sartre, 
1964, p. 2). For Sartre, our freedom was such that we could see it most clemly 
when we are in chains. During the Algerian War of independence from France 
in the 1950s, the French-Algerian journalist and political activist Henri Alleg 
turned the tables on his French Army torturers by refusing to accept that he had 
to give in at any given moment. For Sartre, who wrote a preface to i\lleg's 
account of his torture, this was an exemplary case of an existential hero because 
he refused to be what he was defined to be as an essence and rather showed his 
irreducible existence (see Alleg, 2006). 
Existentialism has been a response to, and rejection of, scientistic m<1teriallsm 
and mechanistic approaches to the nature of human existence. Nonetheless, the 
philosophies of existence have acted as correctives to reductionist biologiC<)! or 
mechanistic understanding of human action, and inevitably these models were 
based upon the presuppositions of individual freedom and responsibility. They 
stress the ineffable human element in creating action, particularly each individu-
al's role. Sociological factors may lay the conditions for actions but do not dPh~r­
mine them. For existentialists, there is always room for choice, howeve1~ little that 
may be. So they have a model of the human mind that begins with the individual 
who is not completely subsumed by biological or social factors. Or even where 
these are paramount, existentialists will follow the role played by individual 
choice in understanding the particularity of human actions within these contexts, 
including how human beings can treat themselves as being determined, as hnving 
no choices. They focus then on the nature of the human condition. 
There was a space where existentialism fitted a need for the insertion of an 
active individual attitude that was not mechanistic and which recognized 
individual experience and responsibility. Dominant models for understand-
ing action did not see humans as starting as active, creative beings but ins~ea(; 
determined cogs in religious or mechanistic wheels. For all the vagueness~ 
many existential philosophies, the fact that the language used is deliberate Y 
1 ,·1n humanistic and not mechanistic is a step forward towards truly wn ':is 
psychology. Binswanger was convinced that traditional scientific meth~; 
hid rather than revealed what was going on in the patient (May, 1Y58, P· · 
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Laing argued that a rigorous 'science of persons' was necessary in contrast to 
natural science medical approaches. As Laing put it in The Divided Self: 
It seems extraordinary that whereas the physical and biological sciences of 
it-processes have generally won the day ... an authentic science of persons 
has hard I y got started by reason of the inveterate tendency to depersonalize 
or reify persons. People who experience themselves as automata ... are 
rightly regarded as crazy. Yet why do we not regard a theory that seeks to 
trilnsmul'e persons into automata or animals as equally crazy? (Laing, 
1960, p. 23) 
Laing always stuck with this theme, and quoted the physicist and theologian 
C. E von Weizsacker, who wrote in the last paragraph of his book, The History of 
Nalurc, that '[t]he scientific and technical world of modern man is the result of 
his dc1ring enterprise, knowledge without love' (1949, p. 190). To which Laing 
added: 'Chilling. I cannot see how knowledge without love can yield a know-
ledge of love; how a heartless method, yielding heartless results can do any-
thing but explain away the heart' (Laing, 1976, pp. 151-2). 
In his excellent introduction to the pivotal volume Existence, titled, 'The Ori-
gins of the Existential Movement in Psychology', May described the issue in 
this Wily: 
The existentialists are centrally concerned with rediscovering the living 
person ilmid the compartmentalization and dehumanization of modern 
culture, and in order to do this they engage in depth psychological analysis. 
Their concern is not with isolated psychological reactions in themselves but 
rather with the psychological being of the living man who is doing the 
explaining. That is to say, they use psychological terms with an ontological 
meaning. (May, 1958, pp. 14-15) 
Some existential philosophers mistakenly included Freud and psychoanalysis 
Within the mechanistic and scientistic approaches they criticized. Yet, as I shall 
now argue, psychoanalysis at base investigated the ineffable at least as much as 
the existentialists did. 
An important response to the past century's upheavals and uncertainties 
came from Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), the founder of psychoanalysis. Psy-
choanalysis is the first form of psychodynamic psychotherapy and was inau-
gurated in the dialogue between Freud's colleague, Josef Breuer and the first 
~Ychoanalytic patient,' Anna 0', who dubbed the process the 'talking cure'. 
a s~choanalysis linked unconscious motivation with individual experience 
a~e neurosis, mass behaviour, and questions of life and death. Freud 
rnptcd to answer similar fundamental philosophical questions about the 
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character of human nature, also focusing on individual experience and 
identity. 
Psychoanalysis was often regarded as scientific or medical on the model of the 
natural sciences and Freud's models of human beings were seen as red uctionistic, 
mechanistic and medical. On one version of psychoanalysis that was dominant 
during the rise of existentialism, these involved scientistic models of energy and 
force, such as hydraulic or economic models of sexual and aggressive impulses 
vying for fulfilment of pleasure and destruction. The official English translation 
for the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Fre11d of 
Freud's term trieb as 'instinct' (instead of the more correct 'drive') indicated the 
scientistic bent of the translators, as did the mistranslation of ordinary German 
terms Das Es, Das Ich and Das Ober-lch as the quasi-technical terms 'id', 'ego' and 
'superego' (instead of 'it', 'I' and 'over-I') (for more instances, see Kirsner, 2007). 
By contrast, Lacan rendered Freud's motto, 'wo es war, soil ich werden' - often 
translated as 'Where id was ego shall be' -as instead 'Where it was I shall become' 
(Zizek, 2007). The Latinizations make Freud's intent seem more technical than 
philosophical. The scientistic bent is in line with the translator, James Stradley's 
direct comment in the 'General Preface' to the Standard Edition: 
The imaginary model which I have always kept before me is of the writings 
of some English man of science of wide education born in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. And I should like, in an explanatory and no patriotic 
spirit, to emphasize the word 'English'. (Strachey, 1966, p. xix) 
Thus the translation ills add to the ambiguities that German philosopher J urgen 
Habermas labelled as Freud's 'scientistic self-misunderstanding of meta psych-
ology' (Habermas, 1971, p. 246). Metapsychology describes the general abstract 
theoretical framework of the operation of the psyche. At this level, as a child of 
his time, Freud did not fully understand his discovery of psychoanalysis as 
really a hermeneutic inquiry, seeking to understand the meaning of human 
actions. 
Thus, perhaps the important philosophical dimension of Freud's thinking 
has been obscured by the way he couched his discoveries in the scientific terms 
of his time. However, many have argued that his discoveries were more in the 
realm of meanings than of causes (Rycroft, 1966), or'that his language combined 
that of physical energy and that of subjective desires; what he called 'force' ~nd 
'meaning' (Ricouer, 1970). This hermeneutic view was in tandem with phllod 
sophical traditions, including existentialism. As Canadian psychoanalyst an 
philosopher Jon Mills asserted: 
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irrefutable premise is that we as subjective agents are never static or inert 
creatures; rather we are a process of becoming, an observation made by the 
ancients from Heraclitus to Lao-tzu. One could argue that psychoanalysis 
has olways been an existential enterprise, and nowhere do we see this mer 
poignantly realized than in Freud. Freud's ntire metapsychology could be 
sRid to be an existential treatise on the scope, breadth, and limits to human 
freedom. reud was profoundly engaged with the questions of life and 
death, determinism and choice, self and other, alienation and causality, so 
much so that his mature model of th mind is none other than a return to the 
Greek concept of the soul. (2003, pp. 272- 3) 
From the perspective of 'force', of the quantitative or energetic side of psycho-
analysis that gave it a scientific facade and acceptance, it is understandable why 
psychoanalysis appeared to existentialists as treating human beings as though 
they were mindless machines. Sartre rejected Freud in terms of his attack on 
consciousness as pre-eminent, which meant, Sarh·e thought, that freedom and 
self-determination were undermined . For their part, such rejection did not 
endear existentialists to psychoanalysts, especially in the United States (Mills, 
2003, p. 272). Existentialism appear d more humanistic and less authoritarian 
and mechanistic than psychoanalysis, and truer to experience. 
If thct"e is no essential or intrinsic human nature that determines our actions, 
how can this relate to psychoanalysis, which stresses how embedded we are in 
our natures (e.g. the Oedipus Complex, the Pleasure Principle, sex uality)? Do 
our drives control us? Are we our drives? One problem here is the way the 
question is framed. Are we something 'beyond' om biology? Descartes's dual-
istic division of consciousness and physical extension, the mind and the body, 
has bedevilled modern philosophy and extended to some twentieth-century 
existentialists, particularly Sartre. This approach assumes our wishes and drives 
are part of our physical biological make-up, whereas our thinking is mental. 
According to George Lakoff and Mark Johns n, who are influenced by a differ-
ent existential thinker, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, this folk theory asserts that 
since our essence is to think, therefore, our minds are disembodied 'and there-
fore what makes us human has nothing to do with our bodies' (1999, p. 401). 
However, this idea of essences is questionable as it does not see human beings 
?r the World as systems. It can be seen to be part of a 'bewitchment of language' 
m Which words which are used to name things appear to thereby confer scm 
substance of their own. Thus, because we can say the word 'mind', we may 
~sume it refers to real processes. Because we can distinguish 'it' from 'the body' 
~Words, this may convey the appearance of necessarily quite separate entities. 
reud did t k un no ta e this separated view when he understood the way the 
ua~onscious mind functioned in relation to the conscious <md outer world. Sex-
. tty was not just a bodily mechanism but was an essential part of being 
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human. The mind/body distinction takes a particular assumption that because 
we can distance ourselves from a concept, we are, therefore, not part of it- as 
Descartes did by doubting everything and arriving at the view that 'T think 
therefore 1 am'. 
Sartre arguably made such an error in criticizing Freudian psychoanalysis as 
involving 'a lie without a liar': he thought that the idea of the agency of censor-
ship of conscious ideas meant that the person had to know what was being 
censored in order to censor it. Sartre proposed the idea of mauvaise j(>i to under-
stand why people denied aspects of their own freedom and treated themselves 
as things rather than as choosing beings. One main fonT\ of bad faith involved 
treating oneself as an object, as a thing that has no choice. Sartre described three 
main patterns of self-dec ption that meant thCit a person was treating himself or 
herself or others as objects, as though they had no choice. These were ways of 
trying to evade our inescapable freedom which we cannot escape. For Sartre, 
we are 'condemned to be free'. According to Sartre, we can be understood as 
having 'existence' or 'essence'- following Descartes's ideas about the non-men-
tal. This distinction was made in Being and NothiHgness as between 'being-for-
itself' and 'being-in-itself. Irving Yalom encapsulated Sartre's gmls and 
approach to therapy as 'Sartre considered it his project to liberate individuals 
from bad faith and to help them assume responsibility' (Yalom, ·t980, p. 222). 
The norm in nineteenth-century psychiatry was containment in asylums. 
But psychoancdysis involved a new turn: listening to the patient for meaning 
instead of simply noting external symptoms. This was because for Freud the 
mind was not equivalent to consciousness and was the study of the uncon-
scious and its relationships with the rest of the mind and the outer world. 
Although for Freud unconscious mental activity played a crucial role in human 
behaviour, this did not imply that choice was not involved. 
lnsofar as psychoanalysis is about unacknowledged agency and intention, it 
shares much with existentialism. Unless Freud's theory is viewed as materialis-
tic, it can be seen as being about choice, albeit unconscious. The idea of 'uncon-
scious choice' is a contradiction in terms only if 'choice' is defined from the 
outset as being necessarily conscious. Freud. proposed two hypotheses that 
were 'an insult to the entire world'. The first was that the psychical is not equiva-
lent to the conscious, and the conscious mind was only a portion of mental 
processes. The other was that sexual drives play a c;rucial part in the formation 
of mental illness (Freud, ] 961, pp. 21- 2). Psychoancllysis is "' means of uncover-
ing what we don't know we know (see Eisold, 2010). This implies a psycho; 
dynamic view of mind. Repression involved having blotted out the memory~ 
the memory so that it is inaccessible and seemingly non-existent. Althoug 
1 
. . . 1 i other Freud h1mself took h1s sexual aet1ology to be the fundamenta grounl' . 
Melctnle 
schools of psychoanalysis (e.g. Carl jung, Alfred Adler, Karen Horney, 
Klein, Donald Winnicott) adopted different views. 
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Psychoanalysts did not know the unconscious of their patients. Tt is not for 
the analyst to tell the patient what to think. Freud's approach was exploratory. 
He insisted on continuing to ask questions even when the path appeared to 
have ended. The meaning or me<1nings of the unconscious may not be found, 
especially where the wishes rest in the end on a decision. The term 'decision' 
comes from the Latin decidere, 'to cut off'. Difficulties are resolved 'at a stroke' 
so that it is a matter of agency, not determination. But that agency is itself indi -
vidual, both in existentialism and in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis was the 
first systematic psychotherapy to focus upon unconscious action. Freud's Ger-
man term U11bewusst had the sense of wh<1t is unbeknown to me; it implies 
unwitting behaviour. insight is a desired quality shared by psychoanalysts and 
existentialists, as is the ultimately unknowable que1lity of subjective decision-
making, as opposed to mechanistic calculation. 
As outlined above, S<'lrtre's Being and Nothingness worked towards what he 
labelled 'existential psychoanalysis', as applying the methods of psychoanaly-
sis within the context of beings which are future orientated, because for Sartre 
psychoana lysis had no concept of the future. Psychoanalysis can be seen as a 
way of unblocking the influence of the past on the present and the future. It can 
be a way of liberating the individual from the control of unconscious wishes. 
The supposed antithesis between psychoan<'llysis and existentialism is errone-
ously conceived, as though psychoanalysis is somehow inimical to the idea of 
the importance of the future because of a focus on the past. But to the contmry, 
the revelation of the experienced history involves unlocking the patient from 
being stuck in the past. Freud discus ed two patients who, he said, 
give us an impression of having been 'fix<'lted' to a particular portion of their 
past, as though they could not manage to free themselves from it and were 
for that reason alienated from the present and the future. They then remained 
lodged in their illness in the sort of way in which in earlier days people 
retreated into a monastery in order to bear the burden there of their ill-fated 
lives. (Freud, 1963, p. 273) 
The tosk of psychoanetlysis is to understCind the past so as to free the patient 
from it. The future then becomes possible to experience as a normal conflict 
between different wishes on the same psychological 1eve1 instead of being a 
~~nflict where neurotic symptoms are expressions of the result of a psychic con-
let between unconscious and conscious wishes. 
Freud made an important point i_n defining neurosis: 
~eople usuaUy overlook the one essential point- that the p<~thogenic conflict 
In neu t' · ro 1cs ts not to be confused with a normal struggle between mental 
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impulses both of which are on the same psychological footing. In the former 
case the dissention is between two powers, one of whlch has made its way to 
the stage of what is preconscious or conscious whlle the other has be n held 
back at the stage of the unconscious. For that reason th conflict cannot be 
brought to an issue; the disputants can no more come to grips than, in the 
familiar simile, a polar bear and a whale. A true decision can only be reached 
when they both meet on the same ground. To make this possible is, I think, 
the sole task of our therapy. (Freud, 1963, p. 433) 
In an earlier paper, Freud described the cure for neurosis as ' transforn1ing 
your neuroti misery into common unhappiness. With a mental life that has 
been restored to health, you will be b tter armed against that unh.-•ppiness' 
(1955, p. 305). This marked a change of register from neurosis to normality, as in 
the normal struggle betw en two conscious wishes. Health for Freud did not 
mean happiness but rather the relative absence of neurosis in the sense that 
pathogenic unconscious wishes were not what were standing in the w<1y of the 
fulfilment of important conscious goals. 
If the unconscious is viewed as an entirely separate domain unlinked to the 
conscious aspects of the self except through physiological or mechdnistic 
impulses, then there is a point to some xistential critiques of Freud for having 
divided the self into two, wherein an energetic homunculus of the unconscious 
drives the conscious self. But while Freud emphasized the importance of the 
unconscious domain, he showed how it was connected with the conscious, 
how access could be gained via interpretation, free association, undersl"<mding 
of cultural, anthropological, literary and social phenomena, jokes, slips, nnd so 
on. Psychoanalysis provides other modes of access to unconscious desires, 
which are very much 'known unknown' parts of our dynamic selves. Con-
scious and unconscious are parts of a whole agent who can be more or less 
aware. 
As University of Chicago philosopher and psychoanalyst Jonatl1an LcCJr hns 
argued, the r aJity principle is not just an empirical read-out of reality. rt is ethic<1l. 
Fr ud is trying to explain 'psychological perturbations' on how neurotics live. Lear 
explains: 'that is, he sees people who are failing to flourish, and he sets out to give 
a psychological account of why that is. On his account neurotics fail to live well 
because they themselves "turn a way from reality"' (2005, p. 10). Lecu asserted that 
for Freud neurotics are gripped by a 'psychologically organized orientation that 
actively distorts their ability to understand the world and their p lace in it'. Freud 
doesn't see pure cas s of the pleasure principle or the reality principle Cit work but 
instead 'theoretical posits, whose joint and conflicted orkings are supposed to 
explain what he does see: people living structured unhappy lives. The pleilSU~ 
principle and the reality principle are there to explain why people Clft' doing_s~;ts 
a poor job answering the question of how to Jive' (Lear, 2005, p. 153). LeM '155 
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that the master-complaint of his patients was 'in my own attempt to figure out 
how to live, something is going wrong' (p. 10). Lear argued further that: 
Fre ud was not well-placed to hear this master-complaint. He was a doctor and 
he conceived himself as ngaged in scientific research. Just as a doctor probes 
for the hidden causes of physical diseases, so Freud took himself to be probing 
the unconscious for hidden meanings making the patient ill With the benefit 
of hindsight, we can now see that a certain clinical brutality flows from this 
self-understanding ... It also blinds him to the profetmd philosophical and 
ethicol significance of his discoveries. (p. 10) 
1 b,we C'lsewlwre suggested (Kirsner, 2006) that Freud was essentially ethical, 
that across the board from clinical to social theory as well as personally, he 
adopted a stoic approach. 
l hnve been arguing that existential analysis and psychoanalysis are cut from 
the same clo th of attempting to define a fully personal ethical approach to 
studying human nature. Moreover, psychoanalysis was also very much part of 
the scene in the development of existential psychotherapy. Boss, for example, 
was a Freud ian psychoanalyst, while Binswanger joined the Vienna Psychoana-
lytic Society at Freud's invitation, after Freud's split with Jung. Like psycho-
;malysis, ex is tential psychiatry and psychology arose in response to a more 
general need in psychology and psychiatry (May, 1958, p. 4). 
13 inswanger combined psychotherapy with Heidegger's existentia lism. 
Freud <lnd Binswanger remained long-standing friends for the remainder of 
foreud's life. As Binswanger wrote to Freud's wife following Freud's death that 
underlying his admiration for Freud's outstanding scientific achievement, 
I was deeply receptive, over the decades, to the greatness and the indomitable 
sp iritual and moral force of his personality. But underlying all that was my 
love for hirn, which from the day of our first meeting in Vienna in 1907 has 
remained unchanged to this day ... nothing made me happier than his 
statement n few years ago that we had kept faith with each other for twenty-
five years. (Reppen, 2003, p. 28) 
Binswangcr was one of two of Freud's most long-standing friends - the other 
Was a fellow Swiss, Oskar Pfister who, like Binswanger, was also connected 
w.ith Jung (Reppen, 2003, p. 281). Although Freud and Binswanger had their 
dtfferences- Freud feuded with all but the most devout of his psychoanalytic 
colleagues - 80-year-old Freud wrote to Binswanger: 'I have always confined 
:Y~elf t~ the ground floor and of the edifice- you maintain that by changing 
n~ s P0 111t of view, one can also see an upper story, in which dwell such dlstin-
gutshed guests as religion, art, etc.' (Binswanger, 1957, p. 96). 
11.. ~ comparison of existentialism and psychoanalysis, far from amplifying 
utetr diffe . Jenccs, shows them to be closer than is often thought as responses to 
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the same social crises and changes with the rise of mass communications, 
science, the 'death of God' and the focus on the human subject. As Jon Mills 
concluded: 
Da-sein is the subjective human being who lives in a world composed of 
multiple dynamic organizations that are psychologically, socially, and 
tempora lly realized in relation to the past, the present, and future possibilities. 
Just as Sartre emphasizes our subjectivity as radical fr edom, and 
psychoanalysis as the pursuit of bringing to light that which lies hidden from 
our immediate conscious awareness, we exist in relation to what we ca n 
become. Ultimately in both the existential and psychoana lytic traditions, we 
can only become mor free through knowledge. (Mills, 2003, p. 278) 
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